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ment before marriage may be sufficient, even if no acknowledgment
after marriage can be shown.2
While in Ohio legitimation is only possible under the aforementioned
statute, other states have legislation broader in scope. Michigan and
California have statutes which legitimate bastards, even though there has
been no marriage of any kind between the parents. In Michigan, a
formal written acknowledgment by the father filed with the probate
judge is all that is needed.' In California, the father need only
publicly recognize the child as his own, receive it into his home, and
treat it as legitimate." Arizona has taken the most liberal attitude in its
statute, which provides that every child is the legitimate issue of its
natural parents.'
A difficult problem is legitimation concerns the status of a child
conceived during the mother's first marriage, but born during her
second. Two presumptions conflict; one, that since the child is con-
ceived during the first marriage, he is an issue of it; the other, that a
child born in wedlock is an issue of that marriage. Under such circum-
stances it has been held that the presumptions are of no avail, and that
paternity must be proved. '
R. C. C.
EVIDENCE
SCOPE OF THE CROSS-EXAMINATION IN OHIO
The plaintiff entered a hospital for an operation at the suggestion of
the defendant. The defendant prescribed a local anaesthetic consisting
of novocaine and adrenalin which was prepared by an employee of the
hospital in the absence of the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant injected the fluid without an independent investigation, that
the fluid contained alcohol and that the plaintiff suffered severely as a
result. A hospital nurse testified for the defendant and the plaintiff
attempted to cross-examine her as to questions asked her by the defendant
as to the possibility of alcohol having been furnished to him instead of
the anaesthetic he had prescribed. The trial court held that the plaintiff
could not cross-examine as to matters not gone into on the direct. On
appeal, held error.'
'Stradling v. Printz, io Ohio L. Abs. 134, 136 ('93').
'In re Harper's Estate, Z7Z Mich. 476, 262 N.W. 289 (1935).
"In re Flood's Estate, 217 Cal. 763, 21 P. (2d) 579 ('933).
'Arilz. Rev. Code, sections 273-285 (938); lo re Silva's Estate, 3z Ariz. 573, a6i
P. 40 (19±7).
"Vulgamore v. Unknown Heirs of Vulgamore, 7 Ohio App. 374, 27 Ohio C. C.
(NS) 445, 29 Ohio C. D. 134, 14 Ohio L. Rep. 5s, 38 A.L.R. 1367 (91S).
'Abcrcrombe v. Roof, 64 Ohio App. 365, 17 Ohio Op. zs (sgo),
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The majority rule in this country, usually referred to as the federal
rule, permits cross-examination only on those facts and circumstances
brought out on the examination in chief.2 If a party wishes to examine
on other matters, he must make the witness his own and call him later
in the trial when he is making out his own case. The reasons given for
this rule are that it eliminates confusion and prevents one side from tak-
ing an unfair advantage of the other. The orthodox or English rule
is that the opposing party is not confined in the cross-examination to the
matters which were testified to on the direct but may extend it to every
issue of the case.' In defense of such wide latitude it is said that this rule
is easy to apply, presents no technical difficulties and tends to elicit the
truth. In some states, including Ohio, the rule seems to be somewhere
between these two doctrines.
The leading case in Ohio is Legg v. Drake." The action was for
false warranty and deceit in the sale of a horse. The plaintiff called the
defendant as a witness, and on the direct examintion asked him merely
to verify the time and place the conversations leading to the sale occurred.
On the cross-examination the defendant's attorney was allowed to bring
out the terms of the trade and the particulars of the conversation at the
time of the trade. In upholding the trial court, the rule for Ohio was
stated to be, that the cross-examintion "is not.., limited by the particular
facts disclosed in the examination in chief, but may be extended to what-
ever the party calling the witness is required to establish to make out
and sustain his cause of action or his defense. Thus a witness of the
plaintiff may be cross-examined by the defendant, touching all matters
which it is competent for the plaintiff to prove under the issue, in order
to entitle him to recover."' There is a limitation, however, that matters
of affirmative defense may not be shown by cross-examination.
This rule was expressly approved in the recent Supreme Court case
of Smith v. State,' but there the court held that the cross-examiner should
not have been allowed to impeach the witness by a disparaging course of
cross-examination on matters not material to the issue. In an action
charging an employer with negligence, although nothing was said on the
direct concerning custom and usage, the plaintiff was permitted to show
on the cross-examination what custom and usage in that business were
on the ground that the defendant might have shown it as a part of his
2 Philadelphia & T. R. Co. v. Stimpson, x4 Pet. 448, so L.Ed. 53S (1840). Hales
v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 200 Fed. 533 (x9x2).
'Moody v. Rowell, 17 Pick. 490, 499 (1835)i Beal v. Nichols, z Gray z6z (xSq.).
A ' Ohio St. 286 (1853).
'Id. at 292.
'612S Ohio St. 137 (932),
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case.' Where a doctor was put on the stand to testify as an expert on
X-ray, the court by inference would allow him to testify, from his ob-
servation of the plaintiff, what his condition was, ruling out the question
only because it was worded incorrectly.8
The chief limitation in Legg v. Drake is that matters of affirmative
defense or avoidance may not be introduced for the first time by cross-
examination of the plaintiff's witnesses.9 In Scott v. Wingenberg° in an
action charging the defendant with negligence in killing the child of the
plaintiff, it was improper to cross-examine the plaintiff's witness on the
plaintiff's contributory negligence. In Phillips v. Ohio Farmer's Insur-
ance Co.' the action was to recover on a fire insurance policy, and the
plaintiff's wife was put on the stand to testify as to the contents and
occupancy of the buildings which had been burned. It was held improper
to allow cross-examination tending to prove that the witness was the
owner of the buildings and that she either burned them or procured
their burning, on the ground that it was an affirmative defense. The
courts appear to be very zealous in enforcing this limitation of the rule.
Thus, in an action charging negligence, questions put to the plaintiff's
witness on the cross-examination and answered without objection, tend-
ing to show the plaintiff's contributory negligence, were later removed
from the record on motion of the plaintiff.' In an action on a contract,
the court of appeals reversed the trial court which permitted a showing
of accord and satisfaction by cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness,
although there was not even a general objection to the questions at the
trial."
Another feature of the cross-examination in Ohio is that it is per-
missible to bring out matters which will modify or explain the statements
made on the direct. Thus, where a witness testified that the defendant
ran a grocery store, it could be shown on the cross-examination that he
also sold whiskey. 4 In Legg v. Drake, it will be recalled, where the
witness testified concerning certain conversations leading to a horse
trade, it was held proper to bring out the particulars of the conversations
and the terms of the trade. '"There a witness testified that he deposited
money in the bank in the name of his son, it was proper to allow a
'The Ohio and Western Pa. Dock Co. v. Trapnell, z3 Ohio C. C. (N.s.) 408 (igiz).
'Equitable Life Insurance Socety v. Burton, S3 Ohio App. 241, 7 Ohio Op. 66
(1935).
rupra, note 4, page 292.
'039 Ohio C. C. 479 (z9x6).
2I 13 Ohio C. C. 679 (1894).
"Circleville v. Sohn, ixi Ohio C. D. 193 (I9o).
3Warner Elev. Mfg. Co. v. Higbee, 53 Ohio App. 546 (1935).
"Bean v. Green, 33 Ohio St. 444 (1878).
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showing of what he said at the time of depositing the money.? In this
respect Ohio is in accord, not only with the orthodox rule, but also with
those states which profess a liberal interpretation of the federal rule,
which, while confining the cross-examination to matters brought out on
the direct, will, nevertheless, allow questions which modify or explain
away what was said on the direct.
Occasionally a case will be found which is difficult to reconcile with
the broad rule laid down in Legg v. Drake. For example, in an action
on a contract for delivery of coal, the defense being that to deliver would
violate a rule of the United States Fuel Administrator, it was permissible
to bring out this avoidance by cross-examination of the plaintiff's wit-
ness." Such cases may be explained by the fact that in the application
of any rule of evidence, much latitude must be given to the trial court to
exercise its discretion where there is controversy or doubt, and in most
instances the decision of the trial court will be reversed only where there
has been an abuse of that discretion. It has been stated that the practice
in the trial courts of this state in regard to the cross-examination differs
in the various districts, some following the federal rule while others
follow the Ohio rule."' In the appellate courts the doctrine of Legg v.
Drake is generally reiterated but it is sometimes more liberally construed
than at others.
D. R.T.
WAIVER OF DOCTOR-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Beatrice Parisky, who had been suffering from an ulcerated colitis,
was ordered by her physician to a hospital for observation. While en
route in an ambulance driven by defendant's employe, she was thrown
from her cot to the floor as a result of a collision between the ambulance
and another automobile. She died in the hospital twelve days later.
In an action by the administration of decedent's estate, the only evi-
dence upon the issue of the cause of death was that offered by decedent's
physician. Held: the testimony of the doctor could not be introduced,
as the right of the patient to waive the protection given him under Ohio
G.C. sec. 11494 does not survive to his administrator.'
The common law recognized no doctor-patient privilege, but statutes
in about three-fourths of the states have created one.2 The privilege is
' Martin v. Elden, 3z Ohio St. z8z (1877).
'
6 McBard Coal Co. v. Wyatt Coal Co., 17 Ohio App. 38 (19 ).
'Phillips v. Ohio Farmer's Insurance Co., 13 Ohio C. C. 679, 687 (894); Bennett
v. State, 4 Ohio C.D. 129, 130 (1894).
1 Parisky Admr. v. Perstorff, 63 Ohio App. $03, 27 N.E. (znd) 254 (1939).
'Annotation, 31 A,L.R. 167.
